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Abstract
SAT Based Attacks on SipHash
Santhosh Kantharaju Siddappa
Supervising Professor: Prof. Alan Kaminsky
SipHash is a proposed pseudorandom function (PRF) that is optimized for small message
inputs. It is intended to be used as a message-authentication code (MAC). It uses a 128-bit
secret key to compute the tag of a message. This project uses SAT based attacks on the
primitive to perform partial key recovery and compares the effectiveness of these attacks
against standard brute force approach that involves trying all possible combinations for the
key bits.
The primitive is converted into CNF and fed to an off-the-shelf SAT solver. The solver uses
clause learning and if satisﬁable, returns a set of values for the missing key bits. It also
reports the number of conﬂicts that occurred before a solution was found. This is repeated
several times for varying number of missing key bits and different versions of SipHash.
It is then compared to the number of attempts to retrieve the missing key bits using brute
force and the results are analyzed to check the effectiveness of SAT based attacks.iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This project explores the effectiveness of SAT based attacks on the cryptographic primitive
SipHash and compares it to the effectiveness of brute force attacks on the same. SipHash
employs a hash function that uses a secret key to generate the tag of a given message. This
project aims at a partial key recovery and is designed as follows. The SipHash primitive
is converted to a Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF) and fed to a SAT solver. The partially
known key bits are encoded into the CNF along with the original message block and the
expected tag output. If solvable, the solver returns the values for the missing key bits and
the number of conﬂicts it took to ﬁnd a solution. The number of conﬂicts is used as a pa-
rameter to test the effectiveness of SAT based attacks versus brute force attacks.
The rest of this section gives a brief introduction to SipHash, boolean satisﬁability problem
and SAT solvers. The next section contains the design of the project and explains how
the primitive is converted into a CNF. The results section contains the analysis of the data
collected.
1.1 Message Authentication Code
A MAC takes a long message of arbitrary length as an input and produces a shorter ﬁxed
length tag of the message as output. MACs are used to verify data integrity or to authen-
ticate packets sent over the Internet. A MAC should be pre-image resistant [6]. A MAC
is said to be pre-image resistant if, given only the tag of a message, it is computationally2
infeasible to compute the original message.
1.1.1 SipHash
Many Internet based services have a server that processes requests for several clients. Re-
quests sent to such a server can be intercepted, modiﬁed and retransmitted to the server.
This can be prevented by using MACs. MACs use a secret key to ﬁnd the tag of the request
which is then sent from the client to the server along with the request. The server recom-
putes the tag of the message and if it matches, processes the request. To process several
such requests, the MAC needs to be fast and secure.
SipHash is a pseudorandom function that is used to hash contents of packets sent over the
Internet. It achieves this by using a secret key to ﬁnd the tag of the message sent over the
Internet which is then used to authenticate the sender. It can be shown as
f (k;m) = t,
f  ! MAC algorithm
k  ! secret key
m  ! message of arbitrary length
t  ! tag of the message.
SipHash uses a 128-bit key to hash varying bytes of data. It uses a series of XORs, ad-
ditions and rotation functions to produce the 64-bit ﬁnal tag.
A version of SipHash-c-d contains c compression rounds and d ﬁnalization rounds. A
general ﬂow of SipHash is shown in Figure 1.1.
It uses 4 initialization vectors v0 through v3, each 64 bits long. They are created by XOR-
ing the lower and higher order 64 bits of the key with pre-chosen constants. Vectors v0
and v2 are XOR-ed with the lower 64 bits of the key. Vectors v1 and v3 are XOR-ed with
the higher 64 bits of the key. It then breaks down the given input into blocks of 8 bytes,
padding extra bytes in case the input is not a multiple of 8. The last byte in the last block3
Figure 1.1: SipHash-2,4 processing a 15-byte message[1]
contains the value b mod 256, where b is the length of the message. The blocks are then
XOR-ed with the initialization vector v3 and c SipRounds are performed.
Figure 1.2: SipRound[1]
Each SipRound consists of 4 additions, 4 XOR operations and 6 rotations as shown in
Figure 1.2. Vector v1 is added to v0 and v3 to v2. Vectors v1 and v3 are rotated to the left by
13 and 16 bits respectively. Vector v1 is XOR-ed with v0 and v3 with v2. v0 is then rotated
to the left by 32 bits. v1 is added to v2 and v3 to v0. v1 and v3 are then rotated to the left by
17 and 21 bits. v1 is XOR-ed with v2 and v3 with v0. Finally v2 is rotated to the left by 32
bits to complete a single SipRound.4
After this, v0 is XOR-ed with the message block and ﬁnalized by XOR-ing v2 with 0xff
followed by d iterations of SipRound. Finally the 4 vectors are XOR-ed together to return
the 64-bit tag value.
1.2 Boolean Satisﬁability Problem
Given a boolean formula involving several variables, the satisﬁability (SAT) problem is to
ﬁnd values for all the variables such that substituting the values will evaluate the formula
as true. It is an NP-complete problem [3]. A problem is said to be NP if there is no known
polynomial time algorithm to solve it but the solution to the problem can be veriﬁed in
polynomial time. NP-complete problems are a set of NP problems for which if a polyno-
mial time solution is found for any problem, then that algorithm can be used to solve all
the NP-complete problems in polynomial time.
1.3 SAT solver
A SAT solver is a program that takes as input a boolean expression and if it exists, provides
a set of values for the literals for which the expression is true. Otherwise the boolean ex-
pressions is said to be unsatisﬁable. A boolean expression can be expressed in many forms
and one such form is the CNF. A CNF is a conjunction of clauses where each clause is a
disjunction of literals. The variable or the negation of the variable in a boolean expression
is called a literal. An example of a CNF involving the literals A, B and C is (A _:B _ C)
(:A_:B _ C). The OR operation is represented as _ and the NOT operator is represented
using :. The AND operator is not shown but is implicitly present between all clauses. For
a CNF to evaluate to be true, each clause must evaluate to true. In this example, we can
assign either B as 0 or C as 1 and the expression would evaluate to be true regardless of
what value A is.
A conﬂict-driven clause learning SAT solver uses information from each clause to ﬁnd5
possible values for each of the literals [7]. It uses backtracking and depth ﬁrst search to
ﬁnd the solution. It reads in the boolean expression and assigns a variable as true or false.
It branches on the variable being true or false. Once the variable is assigned the value, it
simpliﬁes the entire boolean expression. This phase is called propagation [11] where the
program tries to ﬁnd if assigning the variable affects the value of other variables. If it does,
the affected variables are also assigned the thus inferred values and the process continues
recursively until no other variables are affected by such assignments. During this phase,
it is possible to discover clauses that evaluate to false because all the literals have been
assigned as false. This is known as a conﬂict. The assignment of values to variables that
led to the conﬂict is stored and this clause is known as a learnt clause [11]. The program
then backtracks to the point where the assignments were made and reverses the assignment
and the program continues to run until a solution is found or the tree is fully traversed.
The SAT solver uses clause learning and assigns values to the variables. It then evalu-
ates the boolean expression using this set of values to see if it is true or false. This is
analogous to trying different set of values using a brute force approach. Hence the number
of conﬂicts is used as a parameter for comparison between brute force approach and SAT
based approach.
In this project, we will use CryptoMiniSAT version 2.9.5 as the SAT solver. The work-
ings of this is explained in [11].6
Chapter 2
Design
To solve for the missing key bits, SipHash needs to be converted to a CNF which is then
fed to a SAT solver. This section explains how the CNF is built. SipHash consists of
basic AND, OR, XOR and ADD operations. Variables involved with each operation are
converted to CNF and appended to the CNF for entire SipHash. The key bits and message
blocks are randomly generated for each iteration for different versions of SipHash-c,d.
They are then fed to a SipHash implementation to ﬁnd the tag. The tag and the message
block are added to the CNF and random key bits are left out before adding it to the CNF.
This is then exported to a CNF ﬁle which is then fed to the SAT solver. The output from it
is parsed and the number of conﬂicts is recorded. Each of these steps is explained in detail
in the following subsections.
2.1 Building the CNF
The CNF clauses represent the operations performed involving all the variables. The oper-
ations are expressed as conjuntion of disjunctions involving the variables. The SAT solver
learns from these clauses and ﬁnds the correct value. In this project, four basic operations
are used namely AND, OR, XOR, ADD and rotate functions. This section will explain how
to transform these operations into CNF.7
2.1.1 CNF for AND
Consider the operation A ^ B = C, where A and B are variables that have to be ANDed
together and the result has to be stored in C.
A B C A ^ B = C
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
Table 2.1: Truth table for A ^ B = C
Table 2.1 is used to build the CNF. The ﬁrst three columns contain all possible combi-
nations for the three variables A, B and C. The ﬁnal column in the table checks the boolean
condition whether A ^ B = C. In the ﬁrst row, we see that 0 ^ 0 = 0. Hence the fourth
column is 1. In the second row, we have 0 ^ 0 = 1 which is not true. Hence the fourth col-
umn is a 0. Similarly, the entire table is built. Since the clauses impose the possible values
that the variables can have, the combination of values that evaluated to 0 from the previous
table are chosen and they are negated and imposed as clauses in the CNF. The second row
from table 2.1 becomes (A _ B _: C). Combining all the clauses from the table, the CNF
for A ^ B = C is
(A _ B _: C) (A _: B _: C) (:A _ B _: C) (:A _: B _ C)
2.1.2 CNF for OR
Table 2.2 represents the truth table for the operation A _ B = C. Just like the AND function,
we choose the rows whose last column has a 0 and invert the values.8
A B C A _ B = C
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
Table 2.2: Truth table for A _ B = C
From the truth table, the CNF for A _ B = C is
(:A _ B _ C) (A _: B _ C) (A _ B _: C) (:A _: B _ C)
2.1.3 CNF for XOR
Table 2.3 represents the truth table for the operation A  B = C. Similar to the last two
operations, we select the rows for which the last column is a zero.
A B C A  B = C
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
Table 2.3: Truth table for A  B = C
From the table, the CNF for A  B = C is
(:A _ B _ C) (A _: B _ C) (A _ B _: C) (:A _: B _: C)9
2.1.4 CNF for ADD
Figure 2.1: ADD gate
A full adder adds two bits along with a carry-in bit and gives as output the sum and the
carry-out. This is implemented by using two half adders as shows in Figure 2.1. Half adder
1 takes as input two values A and B. The carry C1 from this adder is given by evaluating
(A _ B) and the sum S is determined by evaluating (A  B). S is then fed as the input to
Half adder 2 along with the carry-in Ci. The carry out C2 from Half adder 2 is determined
as (S _ Ci). The ﬁnal sum of the full adder is evaluated as (S  Ci) and the carry out is
given by (C1 ^ C2).
Two numbers, each several bits long can be added by chaining many such ADD gates.
The corresponding bits from each number are fed as input and the ﬁnal sum from the full
adders is stored. The carry-out from each ADD operation is fed as the carry-in for the next10
Figure 2.2: Adding two 64-bit numbers using a full adder
ADD operation. Two special cases arise, namely the carry-in for the ﬁrst ADD gate which
is always a zero and the carry-out from the last ADD gate which is ignored.
Based on this, the CNF for the ADD function can be written as a combination of AND,
XOR and OR operations between the two input variables and the intermediate sum and
carry values. The CNF is
(AB = S) (A^B = C1) (CiS = Sum) (S^Ci = C2) (C1_C2 = Carryout)
for the ﬁrst 63 bits. For the addition of the last bit, we ignore the carry out. Hence the CNF
becomes
(AB = S) (A^B = C1) (CiS = Sum) (S^Ci = C2)
2.1.5 Rotation
Rotate operations are performed on the initialization vectors and the state has to be main-
tained across compression rounds. For this, the vectors are stored as a sequence of numbers
where each number represents the variable name for each bit in the vector.11
Figure 2.3: Vector before rotation Figure 2.4: Vector after rotation
Figure 2.3 represents the vector before a rotate operation is performed. The vector
is stored starting with the most signiﬁcant bit(MSB), namely 64 and ends with the least
signiﬁcant bit(LSB), 1. To perform a left rotate by 14 bits, the last 14 bits starting from the
MSB are placed at the fourteenth position from the LSB in that order while moving the rest
of the vector to the left by 14 bits. The ﬁnal state of the vector after rotation is shown in
Figure 2.4.
2.2 Converting SipHash-c,d to CNF
As described in the previous section, SipHash consists of simple AND, XOR, ADD and
rotate functions. The state is stored in the four initialization vectors and keeping track of
these will help us ﬁnd the ﬁnal tag.
2.2.1 Variables
Variables in the CNF are tracked using numbers. Each of the vectors are assigned initial
numbers. When any operation is performed on any of the vectors, the variable numbers
are incremented to the next unassigned variable. The CNF clauses linking the new and old
variable counts are added onto the ﬁnal CNF.
There are a few essential values that persist through different versions of SipHash, namely
the key, message block, ﬁnalization constant, initialization values and the ﬁnal tag. The
variable count starts from 1 and certain numbers are reserved for these. 1 to 128 are re-
served for the key bits. 129 to 192 are reserved for the message block. 193 to 256 are
reserved for the ﬁnalization constant and 257 to 320 for the ﬁnal tag. The four vectors are
assigned values from 321 to 576. Each vector is stored as a list of numbers starting from12
321 until the next 63 values, and so on. This makes it easy to handle rotation, especially
when there are multiple rounds of compressions and ﬁnalization. For each of these values,
the least signiﬁcant bit is assigned the lowest variable count.
2.2.2 Intermediate variables
A counter is used to keep track of the intermediate variable count. Intermediate variables
are created on the go and are assigned values beginning at the lowest unused variable count.
After reserving key bits for all the known attributes, the ﬁrst intermediate variable starts
at 577. When any operation is performed, the counter is incremented. For an operation
involving a vector, the intermediate variables representing the new state of the vector are
stored from 577 through 640 and the next intermediate variables are assigned from 641.
2.2.3 Initialization
Initially, vectors v0 and v2 are XOR-ed with the lower half of the 128 bit key. Vectors v1
and v3 are XOR-ed with the higher 64 bits of the key. Each vector is assigned the next 64
unused variables. The message block is limited to 8 bytes of data. Increasing the size of
the message block will not affect the complexity of the solution since all the message bits
are known. Hence we resort to the simplest case of having only 8 bytes of data.
2.2.4 SipRound
Each SipRound contains a few XOR, ADD and rotations. The XOR might be between two
vectors or a vector and a constant. The variable count of the vector in which the ﬁnal value
is to be stored is incremented. The XOR of two vectors is handled similarly. Rotation of a
vector is handled by simply rearranging the range values. For a left rotation by k bits, the
last k bits are rotated and placed at the start of the vector.
Adding two vectors is a bit more tedious as there are a lot more intermediate variables.
As mentioned in the previous section, a full adder is implemented as a combination of two13
half adders. Variable space is reserved for the sum and carry of each half adder. The ﬁrst
carry-in for the second half adder is asserted as 0 and is added as a clause in the CNF.
2.2.5 Variable parameters
Given a version of SipHash-c,d, the basic CNF generated will remain the same. The basic
CNF comprises the initialization, c compressions rounds and d ﬁnalization rounds and cal-
culation of the ﬁnal tag. This is generated only once for a given version and all the other
varying parameters are asserted in the simulation program. The key bits are generated ran-
domly for each simulation run. The number of key bits are varied in order to check its
effect on the total number of conﬂicts. The number of missing key bits vary from 1 to 28
for lower versions and increasing this further increases the computing time by a substantial
amount. Higher versions of SipHash have fewer missing key bits, as less as 14. Each time
the position of the missing key bits is also randomly generated. The size of the message
block is ﬁxed as 8 bytes. For each simulation round, the message blocks are also randomly
generated.
The random parameters are generated using a random number generator. Since this project
is implemented in Java, the Math.random() function is used to generate the random num-
bers. For generating the 128-bit key, the random number generator is invoked to get a
random number between 0 and 128. This in converted into a byte which is then appended
to a 16 byte array to create the key. Similarly, the 8 byte data is also generated. The key and
the data arrays are fed to an implementation of SipHash to get the tag which is pushed onto
the CNF. This is done by selecting the value of each bit and checking if it is a 1 or a 0. If
the bit is 1, the positive value of the tag variable is pushed onto the CNF as a single clause
else the negative value is pushed. Similarly the data bits are also pushed onto the CNF
as single clauses. While pushing the key onto the CNF, random key bits have to remain
unknown. This is done by creating a list of numbers from 1 to 128. The random number
generator is used to generate a number between 1 and 128. The value of the corresponding14
bit is retrieved using bit manipulation and similar to pushing the tag, a corresponding single
clause is pushed onto the CNF. For n missing key bits, the process is repeated 128-n times
and the key bits are pushed onto the CNF.
The clauses are exported into an external CNF ﬁle in the DIMACS format. The format
contains all the clauses in single or several lines. Each clause is separated by a 0. True val-
ues for variables are represented as the positive integer value and negations are represented
as the negative value of that variable number. A sample line in the CNF ﬁle looks like -137
20 153 0. This represents a disjunction clause containing the negation of 137 and variables
20 and 153. A DIMACS ﬁle looks as follows
-321 -1 -577 0
321 1 -577 0
321 -1 577 0
-321 1 577 0
Given a version of SipHash-c,d, once all parameters are randomly generated, the key
bits and the message block are fed into an implementation of SipHash and the ﬁnal tag is
retrieved. The message block and the initialization values are asserted onto the CNF along
with the ﬁnal tag. Random key bits are asserted onto the CNF too. This iteraton is run 100
times for each version of SipHash. The simulation is further repeated by varying the num-
ber of compression and ﬁnalization rounds. The compressions rounds are varied between
1 and 2. The ﬁnalization rounds vary from 0 to 4.
Sample input and output are shown in Appendix A and B. Appendix A contains the input
message, the key and the tag. The 16 missing key bit positions are also shown. Appendix
B shows the output of CryptoMiniSAT. The program outputs the values of all unknown
variables including the intermediate variables.
The following pseudo code summarizes the ﬂow of the program.15
for c  ! 1 to 2
for d  ! 1 to 4
List < Clauses > clauses = GenerateCNF(c;d);
for k  ! 1 to 28
avgConflicts = 0;
for i  ! 1 to 100
List < Clauses > temp = new List < Clauses > (clauses);
message = new Message();
key = new Key();
tag = SipHash(message;key);
AppendV alue(temp;message);
AppendV alue(temp;tag);
AppendRandomKey(temp;key;128   k);
avgConflicts += SATSolver(temp);
plotConflicts(c;d;k;avgConflicts=100);
2.3 Data Collected
OncetheSATsolvercompletesexecution, itwritestheresulttotheoutputstream. Thisdata
is then parsed to ﬁnd the total number of conﬂicts. As explained previously, a conﬂict arises
when a chosen set of values for the key bits does not satisfy a clause. This is measured and
recorded, and the average number of conﬂicts for a given number of missing key bits for a
given version of SipHash-c,d is recorded over 100 iterations.16
Chapter 3
Analysis
Theaveragenumberofconﬂictsreportedforvaryingnumberofmissingkeybitsisrecorded.
Higher versions of SipHash-c-d are tested for fewer missing key bits as the computation
time was very long. The number of conﬂicts reported is compared with the estimated aver-
age number of brute force trials needed to ﬁnd the key bits. For n missing key bits, a brute
force approach would need an average of 2n 1 trials to ﬁnd the key bits. The following
graphs display the results for varying versions of SipHash. The x-axis represents the num-
ber of missing key bits and the y-axis represents the logarithm to the base 2 of the number
of conﬂicts. The values are an average number of conﬂicts from running the iteration 100
times.
The program was executed on an Intel Xeon X5560 @ 2.80GHz running Ubuntu 12.04.3
LTS and it approximately took about 4 days to generate all the results. In most cases, in-
creasing the number of bits beyond 16 greatly increased the computational time. Hence,
the results are analyzed for up to 16 unknown key bits only.
3.1 SipHash-c,d
In the Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the points along the red line indicate the logarithm to the base 2
of the number of attempts to retrieve a key using brute force approach. The dots represent
the logarithm to the base 2 of the average number of conﬂicts as reported by the SAT solver.17
Figure 3.1: SipHash-1,0 Figure 3.2: SipHash-1,1
For a single round of compression, the SAT solver is able to retrieve the missing key bits
more efﬁciently as compared to a brute force approach. But as the number of SipRounds
increases, the solver takes more conﬂicts before ﬁnding the right key bits. In Figure 3.2 we
notice that the SAT solver reports more conﬂicts for fewer missing key bits when compared
to the brute force approach. This behavior is not seen in Figure 3.1. As the number of key
bits is small, brute force ﬁnds the right value more efﬁciently. The SAT solver tries different
values based on clause learning. It then evaluates the CNF with the given set of values. If
the set of values fails to satisfy the formula, it will report a conﬂict. Based on the different
operations performed, there will be many intermediate variables created. The SAT solver
tries to assign values to these variables. This in turn will create many more conﬂicts which
is explained by the graph. The number of conﬂicts by brute force approach is smaller than
that by the SAT solver. But as the number of unknown key bits increases, the number of
unknowns increases the complexity for a brute force approach. Hence the performance of
the SAT solver becomes more comparable with the brute force approach.
3.1.1 SipHash-1,x
As the number of SipRounds increases, more intermediate variables are created and it
reaches a point where brute force approach is more efﬁcient. In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, we18
see that the number of conﬂicts reported by the SAT solver is more than the brute force
approach. As the complexity increases, it approaches the number of conﬂicts reported by a
brute force approach.
Figure 3.3: SipHash-1,2 Figure 3.4: SipHash-1,3
Increasing the ﬁnalization rounds yields similar results. The number of conﬂicts re-
ported is greater than the number of attempts using a brute force approach. However, as
the number of SipRounds increases, the curve moves further away and takes longer to nor-
malize and converge to the conﬂicts using the brute force approach.19
3.1.2 SipHash-x,1
Figure 3.5: SipHash-2,1
From Figures 3.1 and 3.5 we can see that increasing the number of compression rounds
has a similar effect as increasing ﬁnalization rounds. This is expected as they both perform
SipRounds and hence create almost the same number of intermediate variables.
3.1.3 SipHash-1,0 With More Missing Key Bits
Figure 3.6: SipHash-1,0
Missing key bits Brute force SAT solver
1 0 0.00
5 4 2.70
9 8 6.33
13 12 8.94
17 16 11.70
21 20 14.37
25 24 17.00
Table 3.1: Conﬂicts for SipHash-1,020
Fromtheresults, theSATsolverperformedbetterthanbruteforceforonlySipHash-1,0.
Increasing SipRounds caused the performance to decline further than brute force approach.
Further investigating this version for more number of missing key bits gives us the graph
shown in Figure 3.6. The SAT solver tends to get more efﬁcient as the number of miss-
ing key bits increases. Increasing the number of missing key bits drastically increased the
computation time and hence the simulation was stopped at 25 missing key bits. But based
on the curvature of the graph, we can predict that the SAT solver will perform better for
larger missing key bits.
Data tables of all results are listed in Appendix C.21
Chapter 4
Related work
Based on the results, we can see that the SAT solver works efﬁciently on lower versions
of SipHash as compared to brute force attacks. But as the complexity increases, it be-
comes inefﬁcient to use SAT solvers. The performance is not sufﬁcient enough to break the
recommended version of SipHash-4,8. Similar conclusions are reached in other projects
where a SAT solver is used to attack a cryptographic primitive [2, 10]. SAT based attacks
were deployed for CubeHash to ﬁnd collisions and it works efﬁciently for lower versions of
CubeHash [2]. But as the complexity was increased, the SAT solver returned unsatisﬁable.
4.1 Cryptanalysis of Data Encryption Standard
Data Encryption Standard (DES) is a block cipher that encodes a 64-bit blocks of plaintext
into 64-bit blocks of ciphertext using a 56-bit secret key [8]. Figure 4.1 shows the basic
workings of DES. The algorithm takes the plaintext as input and performs some initial
preprocessing. It then splits the plaintext into two halves. It combines one half of the
plaintext with the key using a special function and then XORs this with the other half of
the key. It then swaps the two resulting halves. These operations comprise a basic round.
DES has 16 such rounds.22
Figure 4.1: DES algorithm[8]
4.1.1 Logical cryptanalysis as a SAT problem
The authors of [9] present the idea of transforming the cryptanalysis as a SAT problem.
The authors use the DES algorithm to perform the attack. The attack is designed assuming
that the plaintext and the ciphertext is known. The authors propose to track the state after
each operation and represent it using propositional logic which is ultimately converted into
a boolean formula. The details are explained in [9].
Given the ciphertext and plaintext pairs, the authors were able to break DES with three
rounds. However, they were unable to apply the attack to a full strength DES with six-
teen rounds. The authors conclude that viewing the cryptographic primitive as a boolean
formula and trying to solve it is a feasible approach.
4.1.2 SAT attacks for cryptographic key search
The authors in [8] build upon the proposed idea in [9] and applies SAT based attacks to per-
form key search on DES. They compare the effectiveness of two solver algorithms, namely
Walk-SAT and Rel-SAT.23
Walk-SAT algorithm uses a local minimum algorithm to narrow the search space in order
to ﬁnd the key bits. It randomly assigns value to a variable. It then continues to randomly
assign values to other variables and ﬁnds the number of satisﬁed clauses that result from
the assignments. When the number of satisﬁed clauses reaches a local minimum, it restarts
with another random assignment. Walk-SAT was able to ﬁnd the key bits for DES with two
rounds.
Rel-SAT algorithm works similar to a clause learning algorithm as described in section
1.3. Rel-SAT performed better compared to Walk-SAT and was able to break the DES
with three rounds. The results from [8] emphasize the signiﬁcance of clause learning to the
success of SAT solvers.
4.1.3 Algebraic cryptanalysis of DES
The authors of [4] propose a new attack that combines SAT solver attacks with algebraic
attacks. The DES algorithm is represented as a series of multivariate equations and the
authors propose that solving these set of equations will break the DES algorithm. The
authors propose converting the equations to a CNF and then feeding the CNF to a SAT
solver. The attack was able to break a DES with six rounds with only one known plaintext.
The authors conclude that combining SAT attacks with algebraic attacks will allow us to
attack a wider array of algorithms that show weakness to either types of attacks.
4.2 SAT solver attacks on CubeHash
CubeHash is a hashing algorithm that was listed as a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-3)
candidate [2]. A variant of CubeHash can be represented as CubeHash r/b - h where r rep-
resents the number of rounds per message block, b represents the size of the message block
in bytes and h represents the size of the hash output. The hash algorithm feeds a b block
size message and performs r rounds for each message block and outputs a hash of size h.24
More details can be found in [2].
SAT solver attacks were employed to ﬁnd collisions in CubeHash. The attack must ﬁnd
two messages m1 and m2 such that m1 6= m2 and h(m1) = h(m2), where h(m) represents
the hash of the message m. The ﬁndings are as follows.
Figure 4.2: Solve time for CubeHash 1/b - 512[2]
The design of the attack implied that it was hardest to ﬁnd a collision when b was 64.
Figure 4.1 shows a plot of the logarithm of the time taken using brute force attack versus
the logarithm of the time taken by the SAT solver. From the ﬁgure we can see that for one
round per message block, the brute force approach took the longest when b = 64. The SAT
solver however, consistently was way more efﬁcient irrespective of the message block size.
Figure 4.2 shows the results when the number of rounds per message block is increased
to 2. The SAT solver is only able to solve instances when b  28 and b  89. For all other
instances, the SAT solver took too long to ﬁnd a solution and the solver timed out.
Based on the ﬁndings from [2], we can conclude that SAT based attacks are only successful25
on reduced versions of CubeHash and further improvements to SAT solver algorithms will
have to be made to attack a full strength CubeHash 16/32.
Figure 4.3: Solve time for CubeHash 2/b - 512[2]
4.3 SAT attacks on Bivium
Bivium is a stream cipher where two parties communicate by sharing a secret key [5].
The internal state of the cipher is stored in an initialization vector (IV) which is 177 bits
long and the secret key which is 80 bits long. It is stored as two registers each 93 and
84 bits long, respectively. In [5], SAT solver attacks are employed to attack the primitive
and its performance is compared with other attacks such as Binary Decision Diagrams and
Gr¨ obner bases. The authors design various attacks and select the fastest attack on the prim-
itive. They then apply various methods to perform the attack and compare the performance
of these methods using the solve time as the comparison parameter. The authors compare
different strategies for the attacks and deduce that ﬁnding the last 48 bits of the second reg-
ister leads to the fastest solving time to crack the cipher [5]. This is termed as ”Ending2”
strategy.26
The authors conduct various tests using BDD, SAT solver and Gr¨ obner bases. They con-
clude by saying that SAT attacks are by far the best amongst these attacks on Bivium [5].27
Chapter 5
Future Work
SAT based attacks offer a different approach to break cryptographic primitives. However,
the SAT solver was not used to the full extent in this project. Further work can be conducted
to better understand the SAT solver and its applications to cryptanalysis. Following is a list
of a few new approaches that can be tried with SAT solvers and SipHash.
 The project explored up to 25 missing key bits for a partial key recovery. The number
of missing key bits can be further increased to get a deeper understanding of the
performance comparison between SAT based attacks and brute force approach to
partial key recovery.
 The project explored the SAT solver performance on SipHash up to two compression
rounds and three ﬁnalization rounds. The number of compression and ﬁnalization
rounds can be increased further to examine more results.
 The project used CryptoMiniSAT as the SAT solver. Several other SAT solvers can
be employed and their relative performance can be analyzed.
 The project can be extended to incorporate the application and analysis of parallel
SAT solvers to partial key recovery.
 The project assumed that certain key bits were known in advance and aimed at a
partial key recovery. SAT based attacks can be combined with other cryptanalysis
techniques such as linear or differential cryptanalysis and other attacks can be forged.28
Chapter 6
Conclusions
This project aimed at a partial key recovery in a newly proposed MAC, SipHash using
SAT based attacks. The given cryptographic primitive was converted into a CNF and fed
into an off the shelf SAT solver, namely CryptoMiniSAT which then evaluated whether
the given boolean expression was satisﬁable or not. If it was satisﬁable, it returned the
value for the missing key bits. SipHash uses a 128-bit private key in varying versions
of SipHash-c,d. The simulation was conducted for different versions of SipHash and for
varying number of missing key bits. It was then compared with a brute force approach to
break the primitive and we found that for lower versions of SipHash and very few missing
keybits, theSATbasedapproachoutperformedbruteforceapproach. Butasthecomplexity
of SipHash increased, brute force attacks were more efﬁcient as the conversion to CNF
was creating too many intermediate variables. In conclusion, SAT based attacks perform
relatively well compared to brute force approach for lower versions of SipHash but more
research is needed to improve the performance to make it viable to crack more complex
versions.29
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Appendix A
Variable Parameters
Key 0x46 0x31 0x30 0x05 0x2c 0x03 0x37 0x5b
0x2e 0x47 0x79 0x07 0x5d 0x75 0x12 0x58
Message 0x0d 0x51 0x38 0x0c 0x59 0x0a 0x22 0x28
Missing positions 1 5 7 10 13 35 43 44 66 70 71 83 101 115 125 126
Tag 0xab939c262b0322ba32
Appendix B
Sample output
*******************************************************************************
SipHash-1,0
******************************************************************************
************************************************
Unknown key bits : 16
************************************************
**************************
Trial 1
**************************
c Outputting solution to console
c This is CryptoMiniSat 2.9.5
c compiled with gcc version 4.6.3
c WARNING: for repeatability, setting FPU to use double precision
c Reading ﬁle ’CNF’
c – clauses added: 0 learnts, 15960 normals, 0 xors
c – vars added 4416
c Parsing time: 0.04 s
c N st 0 0 4416 15264 0 32 0 45856 0 no data no data –
c Flit: 5 Blit: 566 bXBeca: 0 bXProp: 935 Bins: 0 BRemL: 0 BRemN: 0 P: 0.2M T: 0.09
c Cleaning up after failed var search: 0.01 s
c vivif2 – cl tried 7216 cl rem 56 cl shrink 18 lits rem 44 time: 0.01 Viviﬁcation of clauses
c vivif2 – cl tried 0 cl rem 0 cl shrink 0 lits rem 0 time: 0.00 Viviﬁcation of clauses
c asymm cl-useful: 274/7172/7172 lits-rem:822 time: 0.07 Asymmetric branching
c bin-w-bin subsume rem 0 bins time: 0.00 s Binary clause self-subsume
c Removed useless bin: 0 ﬁxed: 0 props: 0.02M time: 0.00 s
c lits-rem: 1385 cl-subs: 2156 v-elim: 523 v-ﬁx: 0 time: 0.08 s
c Finding binary XORs T: 0.00 s found: 0 Binary XOR clauses
c Finding non-binary XORs: 0.02 s (found: 962, avg size: 3.0) Non-binary XOR clauses
c x-sub: 0 x-cut: 0 vﬁx: 0 v-elim: 124 locsubst: 40 time: 0.00
c calculated reachability. Time: 0.0033
c Calc default polars - time: 0.00 s pos: 33 undec: 3338 neg: 1045
c=========================================================================================
c types(t): F = full restart, N = normal restart
c types(t): S = simpliﬁcation begin/end, E = solution found
c restart types(rt): st = static, dy = dynamic
c t rt Rest Conﬂ Vars NormCls XorCls BinCls Learnts ClLits LtLits LGlueHist SGlueHist
c B st 0 0 1077 1532 834 101 0 7432 0 no data no data –
c Decided on static restart strategy
c E st 8 4098 0 1532 834 139 3865 7432 56787 no data no data –
c Veriﬁed 2366 clauses.
c Solution needs extension. Extending.
c Veriﬁed 2366 clauses.
c num threads : 1
c restarts : 8
c dynamic restarts : 0
c static restarts : 8
c full restarts : 0
c total simplify time : 0.00
c learnts DL2 : 0
c learnts size 2 : 3540 Binary learnt clauses
c learnts size 1 : 1752 (39.67 % of vars) Single learnt clauses
c ﬁledLit time : 0.10 (5.45 % time) Time exploring failed literals
c v-elim SatELite : 523 (11.84 % vars) Variables eliminated using SatELite
c SatELite time : 0.07 (4.09 % time)
c v-elim xor : 124 (2.81 % vars) Variables eliminated using XOR clauses
c xor elim time : 0.00 (0.23 % time)
c num binary xor trees : 362
c binxor trees’ crown : 952 (2.63 leafs/tree)
c bin xor ﬁnd time : 0.00
c OTF clause improved : 200 (0.05 clauses/conﬂict)
c OTF impr. size diff : 208 (1.04 lits/clause)
c OTF cl watch-shrink : 617 (0.15 clauses/conﬂict)
c OTF cl watch-sh-lit : 694 (1.12 lits/clause)
c tried to recurMin cls : 1597 (38.97 % of conﬂicts)
c updated cache : 0 (0.00 lits/tried recurMin)
c clauses over max glue : 0 (0.00 % of all clauses)
c conﬂicts : 4098 (2328.26 / sec) Total conﬂicts
c decisions : 5153 (0.12 % random)
c bogo-props : 25038696 (14225642.72 / sec)
c conﬂict literals : 58309 (47.23 % deleted)
c Memory used : 15.71 MB34
c CPU time : 1.76 s
s SATISFIABLE
v -1 2 3 -4 -5 -6 7 -8 9 -10 -11 -12 13 14 -15 -16 -17 -18 -19 -20 21 22 -23 -24 25 -26 27 -28 -29 -30
-31 -32 -33 -34 35 36 -37 38 -39 -40 41 42 -43 -44 -45 -46 -47 -48 49 50 51 -52 53 54 -55 -56 57 58
-59 60 61 -62 63 -64 -65 66 67 68 -69 70 -71 -72 73 74 75 -76 -77 -78 79 -80 81 -82 -83 84 85 86
87 -88 89 90 91 -92 -93 -94 -95 -96 97 -98 99 100 101 -102 103 -104 105 -106 107 -108 109 110
111 -112 -113 114 -115 -116 117 -118 -119 -120 -121 -122 -123 124 125 -126 127 -128 129 -130
131 132 -133 -134 -135 -136 137 -138 -139 -140 141 -142 143 -144 -145 -146 -147 148 149 150
-151 -152 -153 -154 155 156 -157 -158 -159 -160 161 -162 -163 164 165 -166 167 -168 -169 170
-171 172 -173 -174 -175 -176 -177 178 -179 -180 -181 182 -183 -184 -185 -186 -187 188 -189 190
-191 -192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 -201 -202 -203 -204 -205 -206 -207 -208 -209 -210
-211 -212 -213 -214 -215 -216 -217 -218 -219 -220 -221 -222 -223 -224 -225 -226 -227 -228 -229
-230 -231 -232 -233 -234 -235 -236 -237 -238 -239 -240 -241 -242 -243 -244 -245 -246 -247 -248
-249 -250 -251 -252 -253 -254 -255 -256 -257 258 -259 260 261 262 -263 264 -265 266 -267 -268
-269 270 -271 -272 273 274 -275 -276 -277 -278 -279 -280 281 282 -283 284 -285 286 -287 -288
-289 290 291 -292 -293 294 -295 -296 -297 -298 299 300 301 -302 -303 304 305 306 -307 -308
. . . . . . . 4007 variables omitted . . . . . . .
-4315 -4316 4317 -4318 4319 -4320 -4321 -4322 4323 4324 4325 4326 4327 -4328 -4329 -4330
-4331 4332 -4333 4334 4335 4336 -4337 4338 4339 -4340 -4341 4342 -4343 -4344 4345 -4346
4347 -4348 -4349 -4350 -4351 4352 -4353 4354 4355 4356 -4357 -4358 4359 4360 4361 4362
4363 -4364 -4365 4366 -4367 4368 4369 -4370 4371 -4372 4373 4374 4375 4376 -4377 -4378
-4379 -4380 -4381 -4382 -4383 -4384 -4385 -4386 4387 -4388 4389 4390 -4391 4392 -4393 -4394
-4395 -4396 -4397 -4398 4399 4400 -4401 -4402 -4403 -4404 4405 4406 -4407 4408 -4409 -4410
-4411 4412 4413 4414 4415 -4416 035
Appendix C
CNF
Following is a part of the CNF ﬁle presented in ﬁve columns where each line of each column
represents a clause.
-321 -1 -577 0 321 1 -577 0 321 -1 577 0 -321 1 577 0 -322 -2 -578 0
322 2 -578 0 322 -2 578 0 -322 2 578 0 -323 -3 -579 0 323 3 -579 0
323 -3 579 0 -323 3 579 0 -324 -4 -580 0 324 4 -580 0 324 -4 580 0
-324 4 580 0 -325 -5 -581 0 325 5 -581 0 325 -5 581 0 -325 5 581 0
-326 -6 -582 0 326 6 -582 0 326 -6 582 0 -326 6 582 0 -327 -7 -583 0
327 7 -583 0 327 -7 583 0 -327 7 583 0 -328 -8 -584 0 328 8 -584 0
328 -8 584 0 -328 8 584 0 -329 -9 -585 0 329 9 -585 0 329 -9 585 0
-329 9 585 0 -330 -10 -586 0 330 10 -586 0 330 -10 586 0 -330 10 586 0
-331 -11 -587 0 331 11 -587 0 331 -11 587 0 -331 11 587 0 -332 -12 -588 0
332 12 -588 0 332 -12 588 0 -332 12 588 0 -333 -13 -589 0 333 13 -589 0
— — — — —
46516 lines omitted
— — — — —
-128 0 -71 0 3 0 -64 0 -86 0
10 0 52 0 -122 0 22 0 117 0
84 0 57 0 -9 0 -114 0 -113 0
103 0 -127 0 107 0 46 0 -91 0
-79 0 -15 0 -77 0 -116 0 -42 0
-23 0 -115 0 -99 0 -50 0 -17 0
-49 0 -101 0 109 0 76 0 69 0
89 0 -66 0 11 0 -8 0 -33 0
59 0 125 0 -111 0 -29 0 102 0
-72 0 41 0 -112 0 -93 0 92 0
63 0 37 0 53 0 -62 0 -48 0
-32 0 -1 0 -104 0 -25 0 108 036
Appendix D
Data tables of results
Thecolumnlabeledbruteforcerepresentstheaveragenumberofattemptsrequiredbybrute
force to ﬁnd a solution for the given number of missing key bits. The column labeled SAT
solver represents the average number of conﬂicts reported by the SAT solver to ﬁnd the
missing key bits.
Missing key bits brute force SAT solver
1 0 0.0
2 1 2.93
3 2 4.73
4 3 5.90
5 4 6.32
6 5 6.77
7 6 7.24
8 7 7.85
9 8 8.71
10 9 9.44
11 10 10.39
12 11 11.36
13 12 12.28
14 13 13.27
15 14 14.14
16 15 15.37
Table D.1: SipHash-1,137
Missing key bits brute force SAT solver
1 0 0.0
2 1 5.43
3 2 6.13
4 3 6.71
5 4 7.23
6 5 7.33
7 6 7.87
8 7 8.24
9 8 9.01
10 9 9.79
11 10 10.78
12 11 11.75
13 12 12.61
14 13 13.77
15 14 14.72
16 15 15.80
Table D.2: SipHash-1,238
Missing key bits brute force SAT solver
1 0 0.0
2 1 6.21
3 2 6.90
4 3 7.29
5 4 7.56
6 5 7.75
7 6 8.07
8 7 8.49
9 8 9.15
10 9 10.69
11 10 11.55
12 11 12.01
13 12 13.92
14 13 14.01
15 14 14.97
16 15 15.92
Table D.3: SipHash-1,339
Missing key bits brute force SAT solver
1 0 0.0
2 1 6.24
3 2 6.86
4 3 7.30
5 4 7.30
6 5 7.74
7 6 8.22
8 7 8.59
9 8 9.69
10 9 10.56
11 10 11.58
12 11 12.03
13 12 13.40
14 13 14.03
15 14 15.22
16 15 15.96
Table D.4: SipHash-2,1